Introduction and Background
In the United States and most of the developed world, privacy is often thought to be a fundamental right. Though not explicitly protected under the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, privacy issues have figured prominently in subsequent legislation and are recognized explicitly in many other national constitutions and in the UN Declaration of Human Rights.
Moreover, many nations and organizations are developing standards that concern access to personal information, (e.g. EU Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data -95/46/EC and URLs 2, 6, 8, 9,10). Despite its legislative prominence, however, privacy is difficult to define, since it is both contextual and contested [Goss, 1995:177,2:5] and co-evolves with new technologies.1 Furthermore, the right to privacy is negotiated with personal values such as convenience and other fundamental rights, such as the right to a free flow of information and the right to personal security, other qualities thought of as public goods. In fact, we also may exchange (voluntarily or not) privacy for expediency and safety (e.g., unlisted numbers included in E-911).
Statutes stipulate that government agencies must collect and handle but usually not disseminate individual-level data. The Freedom of Information Act, for example compels the government to release certain types of information, but shields other types of information from public scrutiny (e.g., medical records) to maintain privacy. Privacy-ensuring policies and legislation reflect the growing public concern over the apparent erosion of privacy and the role of As an information technology, GIS has a place in debates over privacy. Indeed, GIS technologies have a distinct role and characteristic abilities that may require special attention. A literature is emerging on the social implications of GIS (Craig and Elwood, 1998; Elwood and Leitner, 1998; Pickles, 1995; Sheppard, 1995) , but only recently have researchers and theorists begun to elucidate specifically GIS-enabled threats to privacy (Barndt, 1998; Goodchild, 1999) .
While , for example, has examined privacy issues related to the collection and use of geo-demographic information in marketing, and Armstrong, Rushton and Zimmerman (1999) have evaluated alternative approaches to preserving the confidentiality of mapped medical information, empirical evidence that supports or refutes assertions made in the literature is absent. The purpose of this paper is to describe and evaluate how two characteristic GIS 1 In an evocative, although undoubtedly controversial phrase, the Economist described privacy as a "residual value" [15:15] functions (1) mapping of address-matched data and (2) inverse address-matching of such data, can be combined to recover individual identities (and thus violate privacy) from data sources conventionally thought to be anonymous.
In current debates, there is often confusion between (or disparate definitions of) the terms "privacy", "confidentiality", and "anonymity" (URLs 1:13, 2:5). There is a general tendency to confuse privacy protection with efforts to keep personal information secure from unauthorized use. For example, most discussions about computer-based intrusions and the resulting policy implications (EU Directive, the US Safe Harbors, FGDC, UDHEW) are based upon generally similar principles2 that are designed to protect not so much privacy in the popular sense of anonymity, but upon data transparency, security, accuracy and a certain individual control over future applications, with at best limited options to opt out of certain databases (see also :177, and URL 2:7). Anonymity (or de-personalization, the de-linking of personal data from its identifiable source) is usually only briefly mentioned in these documents, often as a precondition to certain forms of data-processing, or prior to the waiver of otherwise mandated The questions are addressed through the use of a controlled set of experiments. We begin with data sets that have known characteristics, create mapped representations of them and then attempt to hack these maps to recover the original information from them. In this way we can assess the success of the procedures used and then also examine for systematic errors in the inversion transformation. Such errors can occur for a variety of reasons related to data and the processes employed.
Address Matching Factors
Address-matching (sometimes called geocoding) involves the transfer between files of an explicitly geographic descriptor of location to an implicitly geographic identifier. Though the result is often a single coordinate, the process can be extended to also include arcs, polygons, or raster cells, (e.g., a street, or house lot). Results can be specified not only as a street address, but also may include (or be) identifiers such as town, zip code, or zip+four code.3 This can be conceptualized as a two part process, (1) the identification of matching addresses in different files (essentially a specialized and complex database query) and (2) the transfer of the geographic information between files (a simple database activity). To this point, although address-matching is generally understood to be a characteristic GIS function (Dueker, 1974; Drummond, 1995) , it requires only (sometimes enhanced) database functions. Such address-based joins are part of the role that GIS software plays in IT database convergence. However, it is when the addresses are mapped (perhaps only virtually), and the resulting geographic information is used to build relationships between otherwise incompatible databases, that the truly geographic contribution to IT database convergence emerges.
Inverse address-matching is a slightly different, but still characteristically and truly geographic contribution, in which mapped data, that appears to have lost the connection to whatever other personal information was contained in the database (and as a consequence is de personalized), is transformed to recover the original addresses by digital means -map hacking.
Map Hacking (a form of data spying) is an extreme form of recovering (personal?) information from maps. It describes situations in which one deciphers information, assumed to be private and/or secure, that has been coded stored in map form. The processes described below are generic techniques by which one can recover information from maps. Map hacking arises from the context in which such data-recover efforts occur.
The basic goal of map-hacking is the recovery of individual-level information from mapped -data, specifically that mapped by an address-matching procedure (even more specifically in this research, arc-interpolated address-matching). A fundamental objective of much work in cartography has been an increase of positional accuracy (and decrease in spatial error). Because the mathematical processes (or transformations) of mapping can be mathematically reversed (or back-transformed), and the fundamental digital basemaps are of such positional accuracy, the inverse transformations will likely recover the original mapped data subject to error limitations.
Even TIGER files, which were not originally designed to high levels of geometric fidelity, can be used effectively to complete inversion tasks. Though additional advances in map-hacking can be made by identifying the original pool of candidates, as well as through the use of other (nongeographical) techniques to eliminate potential candidates, our focus is on geographic techniques. While maps can be conceptually hacked with success, several practical impediments to the process remain.
Offset
The results of an address-matching process are often mapped. Since topological information is effectively removed when a map is produced, it must be reconstructed based purely on geometrical relationships or some combination of geometry and logic. Thus when street centerline files such as TIGER are used to provide the geometrical and topological information needed to complete the address matching process, the resulting maps however are often modified in a way that serves to "enhance" their realism. Offset is a way of introducing a displacement of the symbol used to represent the address away from the street centerline. However, because of this graphic transformation, when inverting the address-matching transformation points may be incorrectly assigned to a road segment as a consequence o f offset. This road-switching occurs when the incorrect arc is returned in the reverse address matching process because o f the relative nearness o f an address-matched location to two arcs. It is a fundamental error and must be avoided if possible. In certain extreme cases, offset may result in symbols being placed inside an adjacent block.
Squeeze
Because of the problems described above, the use of street centerline abstractions in address matching may require the use of another parameter (squeeze) to ensure that address-based symbols are located on their correct street segments. The use o f squeeze means that symbols are proportionally re-allocated along their street segment so that they are not placed closer to an intersecting street segment. Obviously this problem would occur only for addresses that are p ag es close to intersections, but a global (segment) transformation modifies symbol locations for all symbols on a given segment.
Hypothetical and actual address ranges
In some cases TIGER files contain address ranges that are incorrect. In many instances ranges are stored 100 per block when far fewer addresses actually exist. Thus for example, a street may have addresses that range from 1 to 39 along a block face and TIGER would report that the actual ranges are 1 to 99. In such cases a map for the 39 address produced from the spurious ranges would show that it was less than half way down the block (39/99), when in fact it is at the end of the block (39/39). In some cases the use of hypothetical addresses is not so much a mistake but may, instead, reflect planning reality rather than physical reality. The use of hypothetical ranges has the benefit that files are robust to changes in physical reality (e.g.
splitting a lot into two parcels).
Methods
We began with a list of known addresses that were address-matched to a TIGER file to produce a map. The coordinates produced by this process were recovered and reduced toa text file. This file was then inverse address matched to obtain a list of addresses that were then compared to the original to determine the effectiveness of the process. In particular, data were obtained from the Iowa City Community School District and consists of administrative records (home addresses) for students enrolled in the district. Four sub-areas within Iowa City were chosen based on a priori evaluation o f road network characteristics to include several different types (Table 1) . Within each sub-area, we have a dataset of addresses known to match. 
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For each sub-area address-matched maps were created using three different levels of offset and squeeze (Table 2) , Using all combinations of these factors, we created nine address-matched maps for each of the four sub-areas: a total of 36 maps. From these we produced 36 files with only ID, Latitude and Longitude. These files were used n the reverse address matching process to produce "recovered addresses". Finally, these were compared to the list of known addresses and a "hit rate" was computed. During reverse address-matching in Arc/Info, we were required to specify a search radius because that affected our success rate in a way that was especially noticeable at the larger offsets.
The default search radius in Arc/Info is based on the bounding box of the layers, and comparisons between sub-areas. We set our search radius at Offset+1 (e.g. 1 ,1 1 ,21m) with the expectation that determining the offset of an address-matched map is a fairly trivial pre processing step that can improve success rates.
Relational joins based on ID were made for our 36 tables, and we manually coded for correct matches. We used two criteria to evaluate the success of a reverse match:
• Exact correct address (strict), and * Correct street only.
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The second criterion allows ns to assess the effect of squeeze on successful matches.
Results
The results we observed show a clear effect of both offset and squeeze on our ability to inverse the address matching transformation. This effect is manifest in inverting for both exact address and correct street only, though as expected the street-only results are impacted less severely. In table 3, which shows hit rates for exact address, we were able to correctly recover more than 95% of the addresses when offset or squeeze factors were not applied during addressmatching. However, our hit rate plummeted, in some cases, to approximately 10% when an offset of 20 meters is combined with a 10% squeeze. Though this decrease was not uniformly observed the best results were only 30% for the maximum values of offset and squeeze that were used. Increases in the squeeze parameter reduced the number of exact hits the most in areas B and D, which are older grid-pattern areas with the greatest likelihood of incorrect address ranges.
In three sub-areas (B, C, and D), the first increase in the value of the squeeze factor (from none to 5%) is proportionally greater than the effect from the second increase (from 5% to 10%). Success rates are uniformly higher for correct street matches as expected (Table 4 ). In fact we were able to recover more than approximately 95% for all values of squeeze when offset was equal to zero. This is an expected result since squeeze will not cause street switching and simply re-allocates addresses along the correct block face. In fact by increasing squeeze any errors arising from "street switching" are reduced (except for the anomaly in area C with offset =10.
The hit rate for the correct street only declines, however when offset is increased.
The differences in recovery rates still vary by subarea, but not as dramatically as measured by the correct address criteria of success. However, subarea A is less affected than the rest by increasing offset. Because of the variability present among the different sub-areas we wished to examine each for the present of any systematic problems in the data sets. In some cases, we became suspicious of the address ranges present in the TIGER files. Consequently, for each arc we subtracted their low values from their high values. This was done for both sides of the street. As shown in Table   5 we observe a pronounced peak at (exactly) 100 for the "potential" ranges in each area. In the table, 0 means the address range is missing. Obviously, area B has the strongest peak at 100, followed by D, then C and A. A has the most missing address ranges, followed by C, then D, and B. In general, A and C have the most even distribution of ranges, probably indicating more actual addresses ranges. B and D are strongly peaked at 100, which indicates a tendency toward hypothetical ranges. Additional variables need to be investigated so that we can more completely understand the nature of error in the inverse address matching transformation (e.g. street intersection geometry).
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D iscussion and C onclusions
In this paper we have demonstrated an ability to accurately recover a large proportion of original addresses from dot maps that were produced from our input data sets. We were able to recover the correct street for almost all o f the input addresses and in some cases approximately 95% o f the exact addresses. Several factors influenced the results. Increases in the amount of squeeze and offset used to create the dot maps from the raw addresses caused substantial reductions in our ability to recover addresses. In fact, at the maximum values for squeeze and offset we examined, our hit rate was reduced to less than 10% for exact address in some cases.
There may also be large local address range "aberrations" in some areas. We observed this effect in older sections of our study area; there was a tendency toward "false" address ranges in which TIGER files contain, for example, 100 addresses for each block face irrespective o f the observed ranges.
Other factors that we did not examine, however, also play a role in successful map hacking.
Cartographic artifacts such as symbolism (e.g., large dots or small) and the level of generalization present on the map to be hacked will both play important roles. Small scale maps will, all things being equal, tend to be more difficult to hack than large scale maps.
With the addition of information about land use, easily obtained in some areas as ready-todownload layers, the overall accuracy of map hacking can be improved. Moreover, if a list of non-residential addresses is available, the choice set can be narrowed by eliminating such addresses from consideration. Such information can be obtained by mining digital phone or commercial directories. Integrating the inverse-address matching procedure with information obtainable from other IT databases will open still more possibilities for improved hit-rates. In fact, the GIS may only be used to produce pools of candidates (e.g., used
to identify candidates on the correct block face -our"correct street category") and ancillary IT information, both geographic and non-geographic, will be used (perhaps involving statistical techniques) to reduce the pool of candidates.
Finally it is important to recall that mapping software is rapidly becoming ubiquitous.
Databases getting larger and more accessible, and more people (often with no training in GIS or cartography) are making maps as a consequence. Address-matching and mapping capabilities have been spun-off GIS and are available independently on the Internet (for example, www.mapblast.com,www.mapquest.com). Certain forms of inverse address-matching are already available on the web (on the www.inforspace.com site) and it is likely that further crosslinking of GIS-related functions will occur. 
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